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ABSTRACT. This paper, based on the rhetorical theory of stasis, investigates a theory of an arguer's dialectical
obligations to deal with objections and alternative positions. It will cover: (a) the nature of classical stasis theory,
(b) a critical assessment of the implications of classical stasis theory for an arguer's dialectical obligations, (c) an
attempt to generalize classical stasis theory, (d) an examination of the implications of generalized stasis theory for
an arguer's dialectical obligations pertinent to the construction and appraisal of arguments.

1. Introduction
In the mid-1980s, Ralph H. Johnson started to investigate an arguer's dialectical obligations. In
Johnson's view, an arguer is obliged to include replies to objections and alternative positions
when she or he advances a thesis, because those whom the arguer wants to persuade rationally
are likely to be aware of these dialectical materials and would like the arguer to deal with them
(Johnson, 1996a, pp. 6-7, 1996b, pp. 264-266, 2000a, pp. 165-166, 2000b, pp. 2-3). Since the
theory of an arguer's obligations can reformulate our understanding of good argument and good
argumentative exchanges, as well as impact on the production and assessment of argument, an
investigation of the arguer's dialectical obligations is of significant importance to the study of
argumentation.
In this paper, based on the rhetorical theory of stasis, I investigate a theory of an arguer's
dialectical obligations to deal with objections and alternative positions. Specifically, this paper
attempts to answer the following research questions: (a) What is the nature of the classical
rhetorical theory of stasis? (b) What are the limitations of that theory? (c) How can the classical
rhetorical theory of stasis be generalized to be applied to any type of argument? and (d) To what
extent does a generalized stasis theory provide a systematic tool for identifying dialectical
obligations pertinent to the construction and evaluation of arguments? In section 2, I review the
current status of the study of an arguer's dialectical obligations. In section 3, I review the past
scholarship on the rhetorical theory of stasis. In section 4, I re-develop the rhetorical theory of
stasis. In section 5, following the spirit of the theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations that I
investigate in this paper, I examine dialectical materials that relate to my position and attempt to
discharge my dialectical obligations as an arguer by answering some objections and criticisms.
In section 6, I offer conclusions and a discussion.
2. Literature Review
A review of the literature attempts to specify approaches that argumentation scholars currently
take in dealing with the topic of an arguer's dialectical obligations to reply to objections,
criticisms, and alternative positions. I examine papers by three scholars: Ralph H. Johnson,
Trudy Govier, and Joseph W. Wenzel. Although I do not claim exhaustiveness of my review,
the approaches taken by these scholars are well-known in the community of informal logicians.
Ralph H. Johnson (2000a, p.168) conceptualized that an argument has a two-tier structure: an
illative core and a dialectical tier. The illative core consists of reasons or evidence and a claim,
and the dialectical tier is a dimension of an argument "in which the arguer discharges his [sic]
1
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dialectical obligations" (2000a, p. 168). According to Johnson, if an arguer attempts to persuade
her or his interlocutor rationally, she or he is under an obligation to deal with objections,
criticisms and alternative positions in accordance with the constraints of rationality. For
instance, the arguer supporting the prohibition of abortion will find that objections and
alternative positions exist to the concept of humans that she or he supports. In that situation, the
arguer, in Johnson's view, must address the objections and the alternative positions in order to
discharge her or his dialectical obligations. If the arguer does not account for these objections
and alternative positions, then her or his act "could hardly be considered the moves of someone
engaged in the process of rational persuasion" (2000a, p. 160). In other words, an argument
should have a second component (the dialectical tier) which consists of a claim and reasons in
support of the claim. According to Johnson's conception of argument, an arguer can make her
argument structurally complete by including both an illative core and a dialectical tier. The
omission of one dimension of an argument will result in its being structurally incomplete, on
Johnson's theory.
In discussing the theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations, Johnson (2000b, pp. 6-7) suggested
that we make a list of the topics that have a bearing on the theory of an arguer's dialectical
obligations. He (1999, p. 14, 2000a, pp. 327-333) attempted to specify the characteristics of an
arguer's obligations and objections that call for the arguer's reply. Regarding an arguer's
obligations, he listed three questions: "What is obligation in the context of an arguer's
obligations?" "What is an arguer's obligations?" and "What is dialectical adequacy?" Regarding
the features of objections that call for an arguer's reply, he listed the following: (a) Standard
Objections1, (b) strong objections, (c) objections that the arguer thinks that she or he can handle,
and (d) objections that the audience wants her or him to have treated. Besides discussing
objections, Johnson (2000b, pp. 6-7) also expanded his list of dialectical materials to include
alternative positions, criticisms, and challenges. His research is significant in that he has called
to our attention the importance of the topic, elaborated conceptual elements involved in the
theory, and laid out the issues that need further study.
In making a list of topics that are relevant to an arguer's dialectical obligations, Johnson did not
appear to be guided by any specific theory. This probably derives from his understanding that
logic traditionally has not treated the issue (1996a, p. 16). Because of the lack of a guiding
theory that underlies his research, we are not clear about when we have a comprehensive theory
on an arguer's obligations, or what a comprehensive theory of an arguer's obligations would look
like.
Trudy Govier (1999, pp. 203-240) critically examined Johnson's idea and advanced our
understanding of the theory by offering a definition of what counts as an objection. She defined
an objection as:
(a) any claim alleging a defect in the argument or in its conclusion; (b) which, insofar as
it does not compete for the same intellectual and social space as that conclusion, does not
constitute an alternative position to the conclusion; and either (c) raised by the audience
to which the argument is addressed or (d) might plausibly be raised by that audience; or

1

Johnson defines "The Standard Objections" as the "class of salient objections typically or frequently found in the
neighbourhood of the issue that have achieved this prominence" (1999, emphasis in original p. 12).
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(e) might plausibly be raised by a rational person to whom the argument might plausibly
be addressed. (1999, p. 229)

Based on this definition she attempted to specify which objections need, and which objections do
not need, the arguer's reply. She (1999, p. 232) stated that strong objections against the
conclusion and the argument in support of the conclusion would call for the arguer's reply. Also,
she discussed the problems that would arise in specifying some objections to be answered while
dismissing others2.
Govier's research is similar to Johnson's in two respects. First, Govier advocated having a list of
dialectical material (i.e., the material that usually surrounds an arguer's position) by specifying
what dialectical material would or would not require the arguer's response. She focused on
objections and alternative positions and attempted to define them, and determined what
objections and alternative positions the arguer ought to address. Second, she did not clarify what
theory she relied on in treating the problem. Like Johnson, she emphasized the conceptual
aspects, such as laying out some of the dialectical materials and clarifying their nature, but she
did not seem to be guided by any specific theories. In conclusion, although the conceptual
elements involved in the theory of an arguer's obligations have become clear thanks to the
research by Johnson and Govier, their research does not have a guiding theory or approach.
Joseph W. Wenzel's criticism of Johnson's theory (1998, paragraphs 27-34) suggested
possibilities of a rhetorical approach in dealing with the theory of an arguer's obligations. He
argued that the classical rhetorical theory of stasis would help an arguer analyze the controversy
in an exhaustive way and construct arguments, attending to the possible issues. According to
Wenzel, stasis theory is a tool that classical rhetoricians used in legal rhetorical situations to
invent arguments. They constructed a case by breaking down the subject matter into: "issues of
fact, issues of definition, issues of quality (value), and issues of legal procedure" (paragraph 30).
If stasis theory is a method to treat controversies in an exhaustive way, as Wenzel suggested,
then it might provide a theory to draw on regarding the theory of an arguer's dialectical
obligations and the dialectical materials surrounding the arguments.
Although Wenzel's suggestion sounds promising, it is a synoptic one. He introduced stasis
theory and laid out its constituent parts, but did not go on to delineate whether his idea it might
actually work in an arguer's treatment of dialectical materials and in fulfilling her or his
dialectical obligations. Thus, at this point it is not clear whether stasis theory can cover
dialectical materials in an exhaustive way.
In summary, there are at least two routes for us to develop the theory of an arguer's dialectical
obligations. The first route is to continue the path that Johnson and Govier have paved, namely,
to further develop a list of topics. The second path is to critically examine Wenzel's suggestion
to see if stasis theory can help an arguer construct a case by incorporating dialectical materials.
In this paper, I choose the second path to investigate the theory of an arguer's dialectical
obligations, because stasis theory, if it is actually exhaustive, has the potential to offer a
comprehensive list of the dialectical materials that an arguer needs to consider in constructing
and delivering argument.
2
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examined implications of the problem in her work (2000, pp. 217-8, 231-2).
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3. Classical Rhetorical Theory of Stasis
Having made a preliminary investigation into an arguer's dialectical obligations and the
dialectical tier, this section of the paper turns to investigate the first two research questions:
"What is the nature of the classical rhetorical theory of stasis?" and "What are the limitations of
the classical rhetorical theory of stasis?" First, I describe the classical rhetorical theory of stasis
based mostly on Cicero's De Inventione. Second, I investigate how much insight classical stasis
theory can offer into the theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations and the dialectical tier.
Third, I examine the limits of classical stasis theory. Finally, I summarize this section.
3.1 What is Stasis Theory?
Stasis, a word that has its origin in classical Greek, means "a contemporary standing between
contradictories or contrary statements, or a thing temporarily 'divided' between contrary willed
and hence contrarily thinking, speaking, and acting agents" (Dieter 1950, p. 353)3. Stasis is the
issue in an argumentative exchange on which two arguers present their arguments to resolve the
dispute. Stasis theory, first presented by classical Greek rhetorician Hermagoras in the second
century BC, consisted of a certain number of stock issues that helped people to analyze issues in
controversies. Although his writing is not available to us, stasis theory was so influential that
later rhetoricians, such as Cicero, Quintilian, and Hermogenes incorporated it in writing their
own handbooks on rhetoric.
Among the five canons of rhetoric--(a) invention (discovering argument), (b) arrangement
(setting up an adequate order of the argument) , (c) expression (using the language to express the
argument properly), (d) memory (grasping the argument firmly), and (e) delivery (controlling
voice and body)--stasis theory governs the invention process. Rhetoricians used stasis theory to
discover the issues in specific argumentative exchanges, and to search for adequate arguments to
support their claims, drawing on the topoi, or the metaphorical places in which arguments were
situated4. In other words, stasis theory generally governs points that are potentially at issue in
argumentative communication, and topoi specifically govern how to make arguments on the
points that are at issue. Although the persuasiveness of the discourse relies on the other four
canons as well as invention, the invention process was understood to be "the most important of
all the divisions" (Cicero, 1949, p. 21).
Although classical stasis theory covered all three genres of judicial, legislative, and epideictic
rhetoric, in classical Greek and Roman rhetoric it was most refined in its treatment of judicial
3

The Latin translation of the word stasis is either constitutio or status. I use stasis to credit Hermagoras for
establishing stasis theory first in history.

4

The followings are some examples of topoi:

(1) topos of the more and the less: I can lift up this rock. Since she is much stronger than I am, she can
probably lift up this rock.
(2) topos of the cause: Inflation adversely affects the economy in the long run. Since the current economy
is in a condition of inflation, the economic condition will soon be sluggish.
We can find the origin of topoi in Aristotle's Topica and On Rhetoric. In On Rhetoric, he (1991: 46) subdivided
topoi into common topoi, which apply to every genre of rhetoric, and specific topoi, which apply to certain genres
but not others. See Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's (1969, pp. 83-99) treatment of loci (Latin translation of topoi)
for a contemporary discussion of topoi.
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rhetoric (Conley, 1990, p. 32; Nadeau 1959, p. 54). Because of its theoretical refinement, from
here on I will focus on stasis theory that governed judicial rhetoric.
Stasis theory consisted of four stock issues5, and rhetoricians used it to discover arguments to
construct their case, especially in the court. They are called the stases of "conjecture,"
"definition," "quality," and "translation." Each stasis emerges out of the incompatibility of two
views presented by the arguer and her or his interlocutor. The arguer can use stasis theory to
understand the issue in particular argumentative communications and to invent adequate
arguments. Regarding the role of stasis theory, Cicero said:
Every subject which contains in itself a controversy to be resolved by speech and debate
involves a question about a fact, or about a definition, or about the nature of an act, or
about legal processes. This question, then, from which the whole case arises, is called
constitutio [Latin word for stasis] or the "issue". (1949, p. 21)

In this passage Cicero suggests broad scope of stasis theory in dealing with argumentative
communication. Let me briefly describe Cicero's stasis theory by showing how it works in an
argumentative exchange between an arguer (AR) and her or his interlocutor (IN) regarding
whether a suspect S is guilty of the charge of murdering a victim V.
The first stasis, that of conjecture, concerns the existence of a certain fact (Cicero, 1949, p.23, p.
179-213). The claim of the existence of fact refers to past, present, or future. For example, the
claim, "John killed Susan" refers to the past; "Abby is friendly to Cindy" to the present; and "The
economy will be sluggish in a year" to the future. In the above example, AR argues that S killed
V. In reply, IN argues that S did not kill V. Out of this dispute emerges an issue, "Did S kill
V?" If IN's argument is more reasonable than AR's, then AR fails in the charge against S. If
AR's argument is more reasonable than IN's, then the dispute regarding S's killing V will no
longer be the focus of this charge.
The second stasis, that of definition, concerns which definition is adequate to describe the fact
specified in the stasis of conjecture (Cicero, 1949, pp. 23-25, pp. 213-221). When this stasis is
in question, arguers disagree about the meaning of words. It is what today would be called a
semantic issue. In the above example, AR argues that what S did was the act of murder. AR
offers a definition of murder and tries to show that the act done by S falls under the definition of
'murder.' In reply, IN argues that what S did was not murder but manslaughter, and offers
support for that claim. Out of this dispute emerges an issue, "Did S commit murder?" If IN's
argument is more reasonable than AR's, then AR loses in this charge against S. If AR's argument
is more reasonable than IN's, then the dispute regarding the definition of the act will no longer be
the focus of this charge.
The third stasis, that of quality, concerns qualifying factors related to the deed specified in the
previous stases (Cicero, 1949, p. 25, pp. 225-285). Two main subdivisions of this stasis are
equity and legality. On these two subdivisions, Cicero said:
The equitable is that in which there is a question about the nature of justice and right or
the reasonableness of reward or punishment. The legal is that in which we examine what
5

There is disagreement about the number of stock issues in stasis theory among rhetoricians. According to Nadeau
(1959: 53-62, 66-71), while Hermagoras' stasis theory consisted of four stock issues, Hermogenes' stasis theory
consisted of three. Since Hermagoras' stasis theory covers issues more comprehensively, I examined Cicero's stasis
theory, which derived from Hermagoras' theory and consisted of four issues.
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the law is according to the custom of the community and according to justice. (1949,
p.31)

He further subdivided the equitable into the absolute and the assumptive. The absolute concerns
the question of right and wrong. The assumptive concerns such extraneous circumstances as: (a)
asking for pardon, (b) shifting the charge to another person, (c) claiming the action was
provoked, and (d) comparing the charged act with some other lawful and advantageous action.
In short, the parties concerned attempt to settle this issue and determine the significance of the
deed. In the above example, AR argues that there is no factor that will diminish the importance
of the S's act of murdering V. In reply, IN asks for a pardon by arguing that S was mentally
handicapped. Out of this dispute emerges an issue, "Can S be exempted from punishment
because she was mentally handicapped when she committed the murder?" If IN's argument is
more reasonable than AR's, then AR loses in this charge. If AR's argument is more reasonable
than IN's, then the dispute on the qualification of the deed will no longer be a question in this
charge.
The fourth stasis, that of translation, concerns the legitimacy of the legal process that governs
the argumentative exchange (Cicero, 1949, p. 25, p. 33, pp. 221-225). This stasis requires a
transfer of the case, because:
the right person does not bring the suit, or . . . he [sic] brings it against the wrong person,
or before the wrong tribunal, or at a wrong time, under the wrong statute, or the wrong
charge, or with a wrong penalty. (1949, p. 23)

Cicero mentioned that because this stasis rarely became the focus of the trial since its force was
not so strong, it was supported by other issues (1949, p.221). In the above example, AR argues
that the procedure is legitimate and the court is justified in imposing punishment on S. In reply,
IN argues that this court has no jurisdiction over this charge. Out of this dispute emerges an
issue, "Does this court have jurisdiction over the charge against S?" If IN's argument is more
reasonable than AR's, then the court will dismiss the case and AR will lose it. If AR's argument
is more reasonable than IN's, then a dispute over the legal process will not be the focus of the
charge.
Since stasis theory, as described above, covers the points that might be argued in a trial, an
arguer can draw on the theory and anticipate what will be possibly at issue in the specific
argumentative exchange. In this framework, an argument will be good if it is more reasonable
than the objections and the alternative positions that the interlocutor actually advances in all the
four stases. In actual argumentative communication, the number of stases to be argued varies
from one situation to another. However, stasis theory helps the arguer understand the basic
issues that she or he must demonstrate. The four issues that the arguer needs to resolve are: the
existence of a certain act, the definition of the act, the qualifying factors for excusing or
pardoning the agent, and the legitimacy of the procedure6.

6

Modern scholars of rhetoric realized the value of stasis theory, and some of them attempted to attempted to redevelop the theory (Braet, 1987; Conley, 1990, pp. 32-33, pp. 53-59; Toulmin, 1987, p. 378; Ziegelmueller and Kay,
1997, pp. 153-167). Although those research projects claimed that stasis theory can be a tool for the criticism as
well as for the invention of arguments, and that the theory can be applied to argumentation in general, they still
retained a link with legal argumentation.
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3.2 Stasis Theory, Arguers' Obligation and the Dialectical Tier
The previous section has demonstrated that stasis theory may help an arguer attend to potential
issues in constructing an argument. The next question to be answered is how an arguer can use
stasis theory to identify those objections and alternative positions that require reply.
With regard to objections and alternative positions to the stasis of conjecture, the arguer must be
ready to reply to the position, "What the arguer claims to exist does not exist." Since the
interlocutor could deny the arguer's claim of the existence of certain actions, the arguer must
offer reasons that the interlocutor's position is weaker than the arguer's.
With regard to objections to the stasis of definition, the arguer must be ready to reply to such
objections as that "There is something wrong with the proposed definition of the thing or event
in question" and that "The alleged fact in the stasis conjecture does not fall under that definition,
even assuming it to be the correct definition for the thing or event in question." On alternative
positions to the stasis of definition, she or he must be ready to reply to the position, "The correct
definition of the thing or event in question is not the one given, but another one, but the alleged
fact does not even fall under the correct definition."
With regard to the stasis of quality, the arguer must be ready to reply to objections and
alternative positions that weaken the arguer's position established through the stases of
conjecture and definition. According to Cicero, included here are questions about justice/right
and the degree of reward and punishment (equity), and the governing law (legality) (Cicero
1949, p. 31). As described earlier, the equitable issues include: (a) asking for pardon, (b) shifting
the charge to another person, (c) claiming the action was provoked, and (d) comparing the
charged act with some other lawful and advantageous actions. The interlocutor might advance
one or more of these equity issues to weaken the arguer's position. The interlocutor may ask for
pardon either by denying intent or by acknowledging intent but still asking for pardon. She or he
might shift the charge to another person either by claiming another person committed the
offence, or might shift the cause of the act to another by arguing that the power or authority of
another person caused the accused person to act in a certain way. She or he may retort to the
charge by arguing that the act is lawful because somebody had initially provoked the accused
person. She or he may compare the alleged act to some other lawful and advantageous acts and
argue that the accused person acted in a certain way in order to perform the lawful and
advantageous act. This list is the collection of the potential issues under the stasis of quality. In
order to fulfill her or his obligation to respond to dialectical materials, the arguer must be ready
to advance the following positions:
1) The accused person had the intent to do the action, and there is no reason to
pardon her or him.
2) The accused person is responsible for the act. Nobody had the power or
authority to cause her or him to do it.
3) Nobody had provoked the accused person, so there is no reason to regard her or
his act as provoked.
4) The alleged act is not analogous to the act that the accused would like to compare
it to. There is a striking difference between the alleged act and the act to which
the accused compared it.
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By advancing these points, the arguer can respond to the dialectical materials advanced in the
stasis of quality. This stasis is extremely important, because the objections and alternative
positions can overturn the case that the arguer presents. However, because classical stasis theory
emphasizes the substance of legal matters, it does not seem to apply to argument outside the
court that does not deal with legal matters.
With regard to the stasis of translation, the arguer must be ready to reply to the position, "There
is something wrong with procedure of argumentation that we are using." Cicero included in this
stasis the following issues:
1) The right person does not bring the case to trial.
2) The prosecution does not bring the charge against the right person.
3) The prosecution does not bring the charge to the right court.
4) The prosecution does not bring the charge at the right time.
5) The prosecution does not charge the person under the right statute.
6) The prosecution does not make the right charge.
7) The prosecution does not charge the person with the right penalty (1959, p.23).
Like the list in the stasis of quality, this list represents potential issues under the heading of the
stasis of translation. So the arguer must be ready to respond to the issues raised by this list. By
addressing these issues, the arguer can improve the quality of the argument she or he supports,
and fulfill her or his obligations. However, as is the case with the stasis of quality, this stasis
emphasizes the substance of legal matters and is not likely to offer so much insight into
argumentation in general.
As described, classical stasis theory directs an arguer to consider the above issues in constructing
arguments. Since the arguer must consider these potential objections and alternative positions
regardless of whether she or he mentions them in the actual controversy, stasis theory helps the
arguer specify certain types of objections and dialectical materials whether or not the interlocutor
actually raises them in the argumentative communication.
At this point, it is helpful to rely on Johnson's distinction between the construction and the
revision of argument. The construction phase refers to the process of initially building
arguments. At this phase Johnson takes the position that the arguer has to respond to known
objections and alternative positions, and anticipate potential ones. The revision phase refers to
the process of rebuilding arguments. At this stage an arguer has to respond to actual objections
and alternative positions that an interlocutor has directed against the argument (Johnson, 2000b,
p.8). In short, the construction phase covers the situations in which an arguer has not yet
established a communicative relationship with a specific interlocutor, and the revision phase
covers the situations in which the arguer has established and promotes the communicative
relationship.
If we accept this distinction between the construction and the revision of argument, it can been
seen that stasis theory is a helpful tool in both stages. The arguer can use stasis theory before
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she or he establishes a communicative relationship with the interlocutor (in the construction of
argument). At this point, she or he relies on stasis theory to help anticipate objections and
alternative positions that the interlocutor is likely to raise under the stases of conjecture,
definition, quality, and translation. She or he can also use stasis theory in the revision phase.
After listening to the interlocutor's argument in court, the arguer can analyze to which stasis
certain objections and/or alternative positions belong, and reconstruct her or his case by handling
these objections and alternative positions.
Among the four stases, the stases of conjecture and definition seem to be more useful than the
stases of quality and translation, because of their broader scope of coverage. We encounter
claims of existence of a certain fact and of definition outside the legal arena. For example, such
claims as, "Global warming is occurring" and "The economy will go into a downturn within a
year" are about the existence of a certain fact. Also, the claim, "A fetus is human." is the one of
definition. On the other hand, the above examples of the stases of quality and translation show a
strong tie with the substance of legal matters, and thus in their present form they are unlikely to
offer much insight into the theory of an arguer's obligations and the dialectical materials outside
judicial rhetoric.
In conclusion, classical stasis theory is to some extent helpful for the arguer to specify some
objections and alternative positions under the heading of conjecture, definition, quality, and
translation in constructing and revising her or his argument. However, because of its emphasis
on the substantive matters raised in trials, classical stasis theory, as conceived by Cicero and
modified by modern scholars, cannot claim comprehensive coverage of dialectical materials.
3.3 Limits of Classical Stasis Theory
Following the spirit of fulfilling an arguer's obligations to respond to dialectical materials, I now
attempt to consider potential and actual questions and objections to classical stasis theory and to
respond to them. They may not constitute an exhaustive list of dialectical materials surrounding
stasis theory. However, some of them are dialectical materials that I conceived of in the
construction phase of argument, so they constitute potential issues. The others in the list are the
actual questions or objections raised by argumentation scholars, so they constitute actual issues.
By responding to them, I hope to construct a better understanding of the nature of stasis theory
and to set out the limits of the theory as conceptualized by classical and contemporary scholars.
First, as has been mentioned already in this paper, stasis theory may not apply to controversies
outside the legal arena, because of its connection with the substance of legal affairs. I admit that
stasis theory, as conceptualized by classical rhetoricians and modified by contemporary scholars,
emphasizes the substance of legal matters, and that it is not likely to apply to extra-legal matters.
This is the case especially with the stases of quality and translation. However, since
controversies over claims about existence, definition, quality, and translation can occur in fields
other than jurisprudence, the issues covered in stasis theory can apply to non-legal rhetoric with
some modifications. The modification of classical stasis theory will be the topic of the next
section.
Second, stasis theory might not cover controversies in which there is only one viable position, or
there are more than two positions, because the theory assumes that the controversy emerges out
of a bifurcated opposition of opinion. Although this objection suggests that stasis theory cannot
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cover all controversies, it does not make stasis theory appear altogether unacceptable. There is
good reason to think that it can be illuminating in those circumstances where it applies.
Third, even within legal rhetoric, stasis theory cannot cover all types of controversy. Each stasis
functions as a stasis (an issue to be resolved by arguments) only when the clash of positions has
occurred and an exchange of arguments can pave the way to a resolution of the controversy.
According to Nadeau, Hermagoras perceived that stasis theory cannot adequately treat the
following situations:
1) There are insufficient data and reasons available to constitute a case.
2) The state of equal balance cannot be resolved through an exchange of arguments
because of equal distribution of the available reasons and data.
3) The amount of available reasons and data favors one side and so a clash of the
positions is not likely.
4) Some questions are difficult to reach a conclusion about. The example given to
support this situation is: "Alexander was said to have been urged in a dream not
to have confidence in dreams" (Nadeau, 1964, p. 378).
The third situation is similar to the second objection I have just dealt with, so I can leave it out to
avoid redundancy. I am not clear about why the fourth situation can become a topic for
argument. I agree with Nadeau that this situation is not suitable for stasis theory, but I doubt that
anyone can make an argument about what happened in Alexander's dream. I therefore leave this
situation out. Then I have two situations in front of me. Let me treat each in turn.
In the first situation, the arguer cannot meet her or his burden of proof to present a prima facie
case. Since a stasis emerges when a conflict of two positions occurs, stasis theory cannot cover
situations in which there is no incompatibility of two positions. However, an arguer can use the
theory to realize that she or he cannot meet the burden of proof.
In the second situation, there is no likelihood that the arguer and the interlocutor can resolve the
controversy because both sides have equally strong positions. I understand Nadeau to mean by
this condition that when stasis theory cannot help the participants to resolve the controversy by
way of argument, stasis theory will not be helpful. However, I think that arguers can still use
stasis theory to understand and analyze the known objections and alternative positions to their
own position. This objection is therefore not so strong, because an arguer can draw on stasis
theory to analyze the dialectical material that surrounds her or his positions.
The list of objections that Nadeau collated shows that stasis theory cannot be a tool to analyze
every instance of legal argumentation. However, his list does not seem to deny the role of stasis
theory when the arguer constructs an argument. Even in these situations specified in the list, an
arguer can use the stases of conjecture, definition, quality and translation as a guide to know
what he or she ought to demonstrate.
Fourth, it is doubtful whether the four issues specified in stasis theory really exhaust the potential
types of issues. At this moment I do not know if the theory is exhaustive in its coverage of issue

A Generalized Stasis Theory And Arguers' Dialectical Obligations

11

types7. In other words, there might be issues other than those specified by the stases of
conjecture, definition, quality, and translation. If this is the case, then stasis theory cannot claim
to be exhaustive in the treatment of an arguer's obligations.
Fifth, stasis theory does not embrace the spirit of the rational practice of argumentation, because
it does not oblige an arguer to reply to serious objections known only to an arguer herself or
himself (Johnson 1998b, p. 9). I agree with Johnson that stasis theory does not guarantee that an
arguer actually addresses serious objections, because it is originally designed for the invention of
argument, or the discovery of argument, not for the delivery of argument in public. However, as
described in the previous section, stasis theory can help an arguer to attend to dialectical
materials, and to construct and revise arguments. So an arguer can know the serious objections
that can be raised in the stases of conjecture, definition, quality, and translation, and construct
replies to them. It is true that the construction and revision of an argument does not
automatically cause the arguer to express the argument publicly, but the invention of an
argument is the first step toward its delivery. Since an arguer can use stasis theory to construct
answers to some of the serious objections, the theory is too important to be dismissed.
In conclusion, these questions and objections collectively set out the limits of classical stasis
theory. The first objection limits the scope of classical stasis theory to legal argumentation. The
second and third objections collectively limit the applicability of stasis theory even within legal
argumentation by showing that people can effectively analyze some examples of legal
argumentation. The fourth item in the list is a question rather than an objection, but it potentially
weakens the exhaustiveness that Wenzel claimed for stasis theory. The fifth objection limits the
role of stasis theory in the fulfillment of an arguer's obligations to respond to actual dialectical
materials.
3.4 Conclusion
In this section of the paper, I have examined classical stasis theory and its relations to an arguer's
obligations and the dialectical tier. In the first part of the section, I laid out the components of
classical stasis theory, based on Cicero's work. Stasis theory is designed for the resolution of
two contrary positions, and comprises of the stases of conjecture (existence of a certain act),
definition (characterization of the act), quality (importance of the act) and translation (validity of
the legal procedure). In the second part of the section, I examined how much insight stasis
theory can offer with regard to an arguer's obligations. Although stasis theory can help the
arguer anticipate dialectical material, it does not seem to be greatly helpful to general
argumentation because of its strong tie with legal argumentation. The stases of quality and
translation especially emphasize a strong connection to the substance of legal matters and thus
seem to be less insightful than the stases of conjecture and definition. In the third part of the
section, I examined those dialectical materials that I anticipated in the process of thinking
through stasis theory and those which I encountered in the literature. Besides being unhelpful to
argumentation outside of court, stasis theory cannot cover all legal disputes, might not be
7

Following Johnson (2000b, p. 9), I draw on a type-token distinction for clarification. If there are three objections
that essentially mean the same, there is one type of objection, but three tokens of it. If we have some other kinds of
objections that are not covered by the four stases, then we will have a fifth type of stasis, and classical stasis theory
cannot be exhaustive. See Martinich (1996, p.7-8) for a concise explanation.
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exhaustive in its treatment of possible issues, and would not cause an arguer to fulfill her or his
obligations in actual argumentative communications.
Finally, although stasis theory helps the arguer attend to dialectical material, and to construct and
revise her or his argument, the theory, as conceptualized by classical Greek and Roman
rhetoricians and modified by modern argumentation theorists, is unlikely to be a helpful in
constructing and assessing arguments outside the realm of legal rhetoric. So Wenzel's
suggestion that we use stasis theory to construct replies to objections and alternative positions is
not satisfactory. However, an adaptation of classical stasis theory might reformulate our
judgment on stasis theory. Let us turn to this topic in the next section.
4. Generalized Stasis
The previous section has demonstrated that although classical stasis theory helps an arguer
consider dialectical material and construct argument in some situations, it is not likely to apply to
argumentation in general. Based on what we have seen there, this section turns to investigate the
third and fourth research questions: "How can the classical rhetorical theory of stasis be
generalized to be applied to any type of argument?" and "To what extent does a generalized
stasis theory provide a systematic tool for identifying dialectical obligations pertinent to the
construction and evaluation of arguments?" First, I reconceptualize each of the stases of
conjecture, definition, quality, and translation, so that they can be more comprehensive than
those understood by classical rhetoricians and modern rhetorical scholars. Second, I apply the
reconceptualized stasis theory to actual cases to understand the extent to which the
reconceptualized stasis theory will be helpful in detecting how an arguer fulfills her or his
dialectical obligations. In light of the reconceptualized stasis theory, I examine a paper by
Johnson about an arguer's obligations . In the third part, I summarize this section.
4.1 Reconceptualization of Stasis Theory
The previous section demonstrated that classical stasis theory has four major problems. First,
stasis theory, as is, cannot be applied to argumentation outside the courtroom. Thus, in order for
us to claim that stasis theory is a tool for inventing any type of argument, we must eliminate its
strong tie to legal argumentation and make the theory neutral, so that it can apply to
argumentation in any forum. Let me call this problem "the Scope Problem."
Second, stasis theory, as is, cannot deal with every type of argumentative communication even
within the legal forum. For instance, it cannot deal with the following situations: (a) neither side
can make a good case, (b) the arguers have equally strong arguments and are unlikely to settle
the dispute, and (c) only one side has a good argument. Although this criticism is directed to
classical stasis theory that emphasized legal argumentation, it seems to apply to the other types
of argumentative communication, because we can imagine such situations that only one side has
a good case in a social controversy. A general stasis theory must cover argumentative
communication more comprehensively. Let me call this problem "the Exception Problem."
Third, stasis theory, as is, is not likely to exhaust the possible types of issues. For example, the
stasis of conjecture, or the claim of existence, actually concerns the existence of a certain action
by an agent. Claims that do not involve actions are therefore excluded from an analysis based on
stasis theory. A general stasis theory must cover propositions of the latter type and, indeed,
exhaust all possible types of issues. Let me call this problem "the Exhaustiveness Problem."
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Fourth, the use of stasis theory will not cause an arguer to fulfill the obligation to deal with
dialectical materials. Even if an arguer uses classical stasis theory and anticipates what
objections and alternative positions she or he must handle in fulfilling her or his dialectical
obligations, the arguer might not respond to these objections and alternative positions in
presenting her or his case. Must a general stasis theory, when used, cause the arguer to fulfill her
or his obligation? Let me call this problem "the Performance Problem."
Dealing with these four problems constitutes the task to be handled in creating a general stasis
theory. In this section, I focus on the first and the third problem, because the scope and the
exhaustiveness of the theory seem to precede the practical problems of exception and
performance. The relationship among the four problems is summarized in the following way. If
stasis theory were to have an inclusive scope and exhaust the potential issue types, then can we
use the theory in every type of argumentative communication without exception? And if stasis
theory were to have an inclusive scope and exhaust the potential issue types, then will the use of
the theory cause the arguer to actually fulfill her or his dialectical obligation to respond to
dialectical materials? The Exception Problem and the Performance Problem arise as problems to
be handled once we settle the Scope Problem and the Exhaustiveness Problem. In this section I
am concerned with the Scope Problem and the Exhaustiveness Problem, because the
investigation to these two problems will offer us an answer to the two research questions listed
above. In other words, by investigating the scope of a new stasis theory, we will understand how
comprehensive it is. Also, by investigating the exhaustiveness of a new stasis theory, we will
understand the extent to which it offers a systematic tool for identifying dialectical materials.
After establishing these theoretical positions and applying the theory to actual texts in this
section, I will turn in the next section to the question whether the generalized stasis theory
provides answers to the Exception Problem and the Performance Problem. Now, let me turn to
the reconceptualizations of the stases of conjecture, definition, quality, and translation.
4.1.1 Reconceptualized stasis of conjecture
According to Cicero, the stasis of conjecture concerned claims of a fact, and he stated that
factual claims cover the past, the present and the future (1949, p. 23). However, the actual focus
of this stasis was the past performance of an act (A) by an agent (S), i.e., whether or not S did A.
This focus is limited in two respects. First, the focus on past performance excludes from this
stasis performances in the present and in the future. The emphasis on the past in classical stasis
theory is in line with Aristotle's rhetorical theory that legal rhetoric concerns the past, epideictic
the present, and legislative the future (1991, pp. 47-48). However, by being consistent with the
Aristotle's tripartite scope of judicial, epideictic, and legislative rhetoric, classical stasis theory
fails to cover performances in the present, and performances in the future.
Second, classical stasis theory was concerned with the performance of an act by an agent. The
emphasis on the agent and her or his act seems to derive from the legal notion of an agent's
unlawful act. However, since the focus of the stasis of conjecture in classical stasis theory is the
agent's act, this stasis cannot cover propositions that describe a state of affairs and propositions
that do not refer to a specific agent. With its emphasis on the past and on an agent's performance
of act, the classical stasis of conjecture fails to account for other controversial propositions.
In order for the stasis of conjecture to include more types of controversial claims of conjecture, I
argue that its domain should shift from the performance of an act by an agent to the ascription of
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a property to a thing. Under this reconceptualized stasis of conjecture, as the ascription of a
property (P) to a thing (X), the key proposition will have the form: "X is P." By removing its
exclusive emphasis on the past and on the agent's performance, the stasis of conjecture is now
more inclusive. First, not only past conditions but also present and future conditions are covered.
So this stasis can cover such proposition as: "Jane is likely to get married to James in a year or
so." Second, since the reconceptualized stasis of conjecture concerns the ascription of properties
as, it can include more than the performance of actions. For example, besides such propositions,
"Wilfrid was the person who committed the murder." it can cover ones like, "The US has been
hostile to communist Cuba," which refers to a state of affairs, not an action. Third, this stasis
can include more than animate agents. By changing the focus from an agent to a thing, we can
cover with the stasis of conjecture not only the acts of entities like humans, corporations, and
states, but also the conditions of inanimate entities like, the economy, society, and culture, to
name a few. So this stasis can include such propositions as: "One function of rhetoric is to create
reality," and "The economy will be sluggish in a year." These three changes collectively expand
the types of proposition to which this stasis can be applied. Because of its reformed nature, I
will label the revised stasis of conjecture "the stasis of predication."
4.1.2 Reconceptualized stasis of definition
According to Cicero, the stasis of definition concerned the definition of words to characterize the
essence of an action specified in the stasis of conjecture (1949, p. 23). The focus of the stasis of
definition in classical rhetoric is limited for three reasons. First, the word "essence" seems to
presuppose that acts have essences. I will not go into the detail here, but the idea of essentialism
has been challenged in the history of philosophy. So it is not wise to buy into wording which is
reminiscent of a philosophically controversial thesis.
Second, Cicero presupposes that definitions can identify an essence under dispute. However,
definitions do not always offer us essences (Pinto, Blair, & Parr, 1993, p. 281). For example,
when an arguer states that Susan murdered Jimmy out of hatred and when her interlocutor asks
what is meant by hatred, the definition that the arguer offers might not show us the essence of
hatred, but merely cite examples: e.g., "Hatred is the feeling that the US federal government has
held toward communist states."
Third, definitions that delineate essences might not be necessary even when they are available.
If people have a dispute over the meaning of the word 'argument,' they might not need a
definition at all, but only a paradigm case that supports their concept of argument. A point that
O'Keefe made in an article (1982, p.7) is a clear example. He argued that for the purpose of
distinguishing and understanding argument as product and argument as interaction between two
or more people, offering a typical instance of each concept of argument would serve better than
offering definition of each concept. He says: "By focusing on such (paradigm) cases and by
asking ourselves what such cases have in common, we may be able to clarify the concept under
discussion" (1982, p.7). In other words, a clear understanding of words or phrases under dispute
is sometimes possible without a definition. O'Keefe's conceptual clarification by offering
paradigm cases would apply to disputes over concepts in general. We do not necessarily need
the definition of a term, but examples that will show us the key feature of the concept in question
will serve the need for a clear understanding of it.
In conclusion, the classical stasis of definition presupposes that the essence of a concept exists
and that disputes over definitions would be about essences. However, a definition showing its
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essence might not be needed for an understanding of a concept. These limits of the classical
stasis of definition collectively exclude ways of understanding concepts, such as understanding
through a typical example or actual use.
In order for us to make the stasis of definition more inclusive, I propose that its domain should
shift from the definition of words aimed at characterizing essences of acts to any clarification of
the meanings and uses of any terms and concepts relevant to a dispute. Under this
reconceptualized stasis of definition, the key propositions will be: "'X' and 'P' in 'X is P' are
respectively understood in such and such ways." Having its emphasis on essences dropped, the
stasis of definition will become more inclusive. First, this renewed stasis of definition can avoid
problems of essentialism. Second, this stasis can include more than definitions by means of the
characterization of essences. Because it concerns any clarification of the meaning and uses of
any terms and concepts, understanding important notions through paradigm cases and actual use
of the terms and concepts in practice will be possible. Also, since the focus is broadened to
include concepts as well as words, this stasis can broadly cover disputes over the way we
understand important notions. For example, this stasis can cover such propositions as:
1) "Rhetoric" is conceived of as persuasive symbolic acts and "reality" is what we
perceive through our five senses.
2) A "sluggish economy" is a condition in which the GDP growth of a state is less
than 1 %.
3) "An arguer's dialectical obligations" is to be conceived in such a way that the
arguer deals with objections, alternative positions, criticisms and challenges
when she or he constructs and delivers her or his argument.
Each of these examples is not a definition in the sense of essential definition. They rather
indicate ways we can better understand the concepts in a rough way. An arguer can also show
illustrative and typical examples to make her or his idea better understood. These two changes in
the stasis of definition enable us to broaden its domain and cover conceptualization in general.
Because of its reformed nature, I will label the revised stasis of definition "the stasis of
clarification."
4.1.3 Reconceptualized stasis of quality
According to Cicero, the stasis of quality concerned whether there are any factors to give
qualifications to the act performed by an agent (1949, p. 25). The focus of the stasis of quality in
classical rhetoric is limited because the substance of this stasis is connected to legal issues. As
we have seen in section 3, this stasis concerned: (a) asking for a pardon, (b) shifting the charge to
others, (c) justifying an act based on the provocation of the act by others, and (d) justifying the
act based on the end of the act (Cicero, 1949, pp. 237-261). These issues function to weaken or
overturn the case that the arguer has presented to the judge, or to shift the presumption, and their
domain is legal argumentation in a strict sense. With emphasis on the qualifying factors that lead
to questioning or overturning the arguer's case, the classical stasis of quality can cover only legal
or quasi-legal issues. So it is unlikely to deal with such aforementioned topics as a sluggish
economy, the function of rhetoric in creating reality, or the obligation of an arguer to handle
objections and alternative positions.
In order for the stasis of quality to include more types of controversial claims about qualifying
factors, I argue that its domain should shift from qualifications of a prima facie judgment of guilt
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by exempting factors to the questioning or overriding of an arguer's position by defeating
conditions. Under the reconceptualized stasis of quality, the key proposition will be: "X is P
unless some qualifying factor exists," and "X and P are respectively conceived in such and such
way unless some qualifying factor exists." Setting aside its emphasis on judgments of guilt, the
revised stasis of quality will cover qualifying factors more comprehensively than its classical
counterpart. For example, it would include not only factors related to the presumption of
innocence, but also factors related to other types of presumption. An arguer, facing objections
and alternative positions that can question or override the presumptive force of her or his
position, must argue that objections and alternative positions raised by her or his interlocutor will
not diminish the logical cogency of the case.
The importance of the presumptive force of argument is explained well by Walton (1996, pp. 6,
8, 13). He states that non-deductive and non-scientifically-inductive argument is presumptive in
nature8. Although it offers the audience some reason to accept the conclusion, "it is subject to
default relative to what is known (or becomes known) of the further circumstances of the case"
(1996, p. 8). Just as an argument in Walton's conception must withstand an examination that can
change the presumption, so does the case presented by an arguer have to withstand an
examination in the stasis of quality that can shift its presumption. This stasis can cover such
propositions as:
1) Rhetoric is broadly conceived of as persuasive symbolic acts, unless coercive
force is involved in the process of persuasion.
2) A sluggish economy is the condition in which GDP growth is less than 1%,
unless the unemployment rate is zero.
3) An arguer's dialectical obligations is fulfilled when she or he handles objections,
alternative positions, criticisms and challenges in constructing and delivering the
argument. The arguer is obliged to fulfill her or his dialectical obligation unless
there is not enough time and space to handle these dialectical materials.
These examples concern whether there are any qualifying factors that might diminish the
cogency of the argument established in the stases of predication and clarification. The phrase
"some qualifying factor" in the above key proposition might seem to be a little too broad.
However, the very broadness enables us to accommodate many types of circumstances that can
change a presumption. In this revised stasis of quality, the arguer must anticipate dialectical

8

Walton had a legal trial in mind in describing the presumptive force of argument. He said:

Once put forward by a proponent in a dialogue (for example, in a legal trial), the argument creates a presumption
that shifts a weight or burden onto anyone who would doubt it to ask appropriate critical questions, or to give
evidence to indicate that this case is somehow not typical in a relevant respect. (1996, p. 8)
This passage is important for two interrelated but separate reasons. First, his writing suggests that turning legal
argumentation theory into theory for argumentation in general is an adequate move. Johnson (2000a, p. 26)
questions such aspects of legal argumentation as an adversarial approach, but Walton's passage implies that we can
create a good theory of argument out of legal argumentation theory. I will deal with this later in section 5, when I
talk about the Performance Problem. Second, the shift of presumption is important to argumentation in general.
Thus stasis theory, which contains the notion of the shift of presumption, is an adequate tool to analyze natural
argumentation.
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materials that can weaken or override a case, and address them. Because of its reformed nature, I
will label the revised stasis of quality "the stasis of qualification."
4.1.4 Reconceptualized stasis of translation
According to Cicero, the stasis of translation concerned questions about the procedure of legal
argumentative communication (1951, p. 23). In this stasis, what is questioned are: (a) Does the
right person bring the charge against the right person? (b) Does the right court hold the trial at
the right time, under the right statute? and (c) Is the charge correct and is the penalty adequate?
These issues question whether the procedures governing the argumentative communication are
adequate. As these examples indicate, the classical stasis of translation, as is the case with that
of quality, is connected to legal matters in its substance. So the same story that I told about the
stasis of quality would apply. That is, the classical rhetorical stasis of translation cannot cover
domains outside legal or quasi-legal issues because of its substantive connection to legal issues.
So procedural issues that have nothing to do with a legal charge against somebody's act are
outside the domain of this stasis.
In order for the stasis of translation to include more types of controversial claims about
procedures, I argue that its domain should shift from questions about the procedures of legal
argumentative communication to those about the procedures of argumentative communication in
general. Under the reconceptualized stasis of translation, the key proposition will be: "This is
the right person, place, and time to discuss 'X and P.'" By its link to legal settings deemphasized, the stasis of translation can cover not only procedures governing legal
argumentation but argumentation in general. In this stasis, the arguer must anticipate dialectical
materials concerning argumentative procedures, and must argue that the procedure that the
relevant parties follow is adequate for the argumentative communication they are engaged in.
The importance of procedure to argumentation has been recognized by scholars (Wenzel, 1990,
p. 16; Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, et al., 1996, pp. 274-311). Van Eemeren
and Grootendorst constructed their pragma-dialectic argumentation theory based on procedural
rules. In their theory, if parties in argumentation abide by the rules designed to efficiently
resolve differences of opinion, their argumentation will be judged to be good. On the other hand,
if one of the parties violates any of the procedural rules for argumentative communications called
"critical discussions," then the argumentation will be fallacious. Although the contents of their
procedural rules are different from those of the above key proposition of the stasis of translation,
the point they make about the importance of procedure in argumentation is worthwhile to attend
to. Just as the arguers in pragma-dialectics must follow procedural rules, so does an arguer using
stasis theory have to pass the scrutiny of the procedural examination specified above. This stasis
can cover such proposition as:
1) This is the right person to talk about economic conditions, because she has a Ph.
D. in economics and now works for the World Bank.
2) Since this is a journal on bioengineering, it is not the place to publish your article
on the relationship between rhetoric and reality.
As these examples show, the reconceptualized stasis of translation concerns whether the
procedure of argument is adequate to sustain rational practice. It covers the procedure of
argumentation in general, so it is more inclusive than its classical counterpart. Because of its
reformed nature, I will label the revised stasis of translation "stasis of procedure."
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In summary, reconceptualized stasis theory consists of four stases, like classical stasis theory.
The stasis of conjecture now becomes the stasis of predication, and concerns the ascription of a
property to a thing. Its focus has broadened to include propositions referring to any time,
conditions other than the performance of and act, and animate and inanimate things. The stasis
of definition now becomes the stasis of clarification, and concerns the meaning and uses of any
terms and concepts relevant to the dispute. Its focus has broadened to include the understanding
of concepts in general, without a commitment to essentialism. The stasis of quality now
becomes the stasis of qualification, and concerns qualifying factors in general. Its focus has
broadened to include more than qualifying factors on a guilty charge in court. The stasis of
translation now becomes the stasis of procedure, and concerns questions about the procedures
governing argumentation in general. Its focus has broadened to include more than procedural
questions governing trials. By removing its strong substantive tie with legal argumentation I
have turned stasis theory from a theory applied to legal argumentation to the theory that can be
generally applied to argumentation that involves the questions about: (a) ascriptions of
properties, (b) conceptualizations, (c) qualifications, and (d) procedures governing argumentative
communication.
I am not sure whether the renewed stasis theory can cover every type of argumentative
communication. However, debates over properties, concepts, qualifying factors and procedures
seem to be common when arguers present their arguments, because they must be clear about: (a)
the structure of the world, by assigning or identifying properties, (b) the meanings and uses of
words and concepts, (c) whether qualifying factors exists for their cases, and (d) the adequacy of
the procedures that they engage in. Therefore, I argue that the new stasis theory extensively
covers many more types of argumentative communication than classical stasis theory did. In the
next section, I will apply the renewed stasis theory to actual texts to see if it can be applied
outside legal argumentation, and examine to what extent it offers for us a systematic tool for
identifying and evaluating arguments.
4.2 Application of the Reconceptualized Stasis Theory
In this section, I use the reconceptualized stasis theory and analyze how Johnson made
arguments for the theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations in his Ontario Philosophical
Society (OPS) paper (1996). Since his OPS paper was one of the first papers in which Johnson
developed the idea of "the dialectical tier" and an arguer's dialectical obligations, this paper
belongs to what Johnson called "the construction phase" of argument (2000b, p.8). So according
to his own theory he had the task of addressing known objections and alternative positions and
anticipating possible objections and alternative positions.
In this paper, Johnson advanced two related but independent theses: (1) An argument should
consist of a two-tier structure of an illative core and a dialectical tier, and (2) an arguer has the
following dialectical obligations to reply to: (a) objections that the arguer thinks that she or he
can respond to, (b) objections that the arguer's audience would like to have treated, and (c)
Standard Objections. I will analyze each of the claims in turn to see how Johnson discharged his
obligation to address known and possible objections and alternative positions to his claims.
The first claim, that an argument should consist of an illative core and a dialectical tier, ascribes
certain properties to argument. Instead of merely consisting of collections of propositions in
which one (the conclusion) is supported by others (the premises), an argument must have an
additional component, called "the dialectical tier," in which the arguer handles objections,
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opposing points of view, and criticisms. Since Johnson ascribed the two-tier structure as a
property of arguments, we can take the first claim to be directed to the stasis of predication.
Advancing this claim about argument is equal to addressing the traditional view of argument
among logicians, because Johnson argued that the traditional account of argument, which did not
consider a dialectical tier, could not adequately ascribe the proper features to arguments. So
Johnson attempted to establish his claim by addressing one alternative position to his account of
argument.
A question might emerge in the mind of the readers, "What is the illative core and the dialectical
tier?" This question is in the domain of the stasis of clarification, because it concerns how
Johnson conceptualized these elements. Coming from a pragmatic perspective, Johnson broadly
conceived that an argument is the product of the practice of argumentation, one primary purpose
of which is rational persuasion. Since an arguer in this practice must support a claim to
rationally persuade the other, the product consists of the claim that the arguer advances plus the
reasons or evidence that she or he offers for supporting the claim. This component is what
Johnson calls, following Blair, the illative core. So the illative core is a little similar to the
traditional conception of argument in that both focus on a relationship among statements or
propositions. However, the illative core also focuses on the purpose that the collection of the
statements or the propositions serves--rational persuasion. The dialectical tier is the second
element of Johnson's conception of argument, but he did not describe the dialectical tier in terms
of its structure. Instead, he focused on its function. He argued that the dialectical tier is the part
of an argument in which the arguer deals with objections, opposing points of view, and
criticisms.
When Johnson (1996) advanced the thesis that an argument should consist of a two-tier structure,
and explained its components, he did not address possible objections or alternative positions to
his conceptualization of the illative core and the dialectical tier. In this respect, it is doubtful if
Johnson fulfilled his dialectical obligation, because he, as the arguer, was obligated to deal with
them.
With regard to the stases of qualification and procedure, Johnson did not mention any defeating
conditions for his conception of argument or any possible procedural problems with his
argumentation. These circumstantial conditions imply that he did not imagine any fatal problems
with his conception of argument (if there were any), and that he believed the procedure he
engaged in to advance his claim was right. It is also to be noted that neither Govier nor Wenzel-the two principal critics of Johnson's theory--made any arguments on the stasis of procedure, and
this issue has not become the focus throughout the development of the theory of an arguer's
dialectical obligations and the dialectical tier. I will elaborate the implication of the omission of
the stasis of procedure in the next section.
The second claim Johnson made in the OPS paper was that an arguer has the dialectical
obligation to reply to objections, opposing points of view, and criticisms. Regarding objections,
the arguer has to respond to: (a) objections that the arguer thinks that she or he can respond to,
(b) objections that the arguer's audience would like to have treated, and (c) Standard Objections.
This claim ascribes two properties to the arguer's performance. First, certain aspects of the
arguer's performance are obligatory. Second, the obligatory aspect of the arguer's performance is
to reply to the three types of objections above, opposing points of view and criticisms. In the
OPS paper, Johnson subdivided objections into those addressed to the illative core and those
addressed to the dialectical tier, and focused on the objections addressed to the illative core. The
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four routes to fulfill an arguer's obligations to reply to objections addressed to the illative core
are: (a) replying to all possible and actual types of objections, (b) replying to all and only
objections that the arguer thinks that she or he can handle, (c) replying to all the objections that
the audience would like the arguer to treat, and (d) replying to The Standard Objections. Judging
(a) to be impossible in light to an arguer's epistemic limitations, Johnson requires that arguers
handle the objection-types specified in (b) through (d).
We can regard the examination of whether an arguer is obliged to respond to all possible and
actual objection types as Johnson's act of addressing one alternative position. If addressing all
possible and actual objections is the approach that the arguer should and can take, then the claim
Johnson made in the stasis of predication, i.e., answering objections specified in (b) through (d)
above, is not a satisfactory approach to the fulfillment of dialectical obligations, unless these
cover all possible and actual objection types. By demonstrating that an arguer does not have to
address all possible and actual objection types, Johnson responded to one alternative approach in
the treatment of the objections.
The conceptual clarification of such notions as an arguer's dialectical obligations, objections, The
Standard Objections, opposing points of view, and criticisms belongs to the stasis of
clarification. There are a few ways of clarifying obligations9. One approach is to specify the
content of the obligation in question. Another approach is to specify the type of the obligation,
such as legal, moral, prudential, epistemic, or aesthetic obligation. And still another is to specify
the overarching concept of obligation common to all types of obligations, i.e., "What do we
mean by 'obligation' when we say, 'a person has an obligation to X?'" Johnson took the first
approach and attempted to specify the content of the obligations, by offering the list of
performances that an arguer must do and by characterizing the content of those performances.
As a result, the reader cannot be clear what type of obligation the dialectical tier is, or what
overarching features, if any, such obligations would have.
Taking the first approach, Johnson listed three major types of material that the arguer must reply
to: objections, opposing points of view, and criticisms. However, the conceptual demarcation
among these three types of dialectical materials was not clearly set in the paper, and Johnson
sometimes referred to objections and criticisms, when he was actually concerned with objections.
For example, in discussing which objections an arguer must reply to, he stated, "The arguer must
address all possible and actual objections and criticisms" (1996, emphasis in original p. 10). In
the OPS paper he actually focused on an arguer's obligations to reply to objections, but ignored
opposing points of view and criticisms. He did not offer a general description of objections, but
described The Standard Objections as a "class of salient objections which are typically or
frequently found in the neighbourhood of the issue that the argument is addressing" (p. 15).
By specifying the content of obligations and by conceptually clarifying "The Standard
Objections," Johnson attempted to elucidate the notion of an arguer's dialectical obligation.
Although he made this clear to some extent by specifying its content, some might wonder why
he decided to specify the content of an arguer's dialectical obligations rather than specifying the
type of obligation or the overarching features of obligations. They might even argue,
"Specifying the type of an arguer's dialectical obligation or the general features of obligation will
let us better understand dialectical obligation than specifying the contents of the obligation."
9
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Johnson should have anticipated these objections and mentioned why he decided to specify the
content of the obligation only.
With regard to the stases of qualification and procedure, Johnson did not mention anything about
the procedure he was following. We may therefore assume that he thought that no fatal
problems existed in his list of objections and the procedure was adequate.
As we have seen, Johnson covered the stases of predication and clarification in both claims he
advanced in the OPS paper. However, he did not include the stases of qualification and
procedure in either claim. From the perspective of stasis theory, Johnson did not address all the
issues, and he might thus appear to have failed to meet his obligations as an arguer. However, if
I grant what Johnson claimed in the paper, an arguer does not have to address all possible and
actual objection types. We might therefore be able to excuse Johnson for ignoring the stases of
qualification and procedure at the construction phase of argument.
4.3 Conclusion
In this section I have attempted to reconceptualize stasis theory so that it can apply to
argumentation in general, and examined the extent to which a reconceptualization of stasis
theory offers a systematic tool to identify dialectical obligations for the appraisal of arguments.
Based on the descriptions in the previous parts, I will draw three conclusions.
First, having its substantive connection to legal issues eliminated, the reconceptualized stasis
theory appears to have broader scope than its classical counterpart. Since the reconceptualization
has made each of the constituent stases neutral, the new stasis theory seems to apply to
argumentation in various forums. The application in the second section of this section has
demonstrated that the new stasis theory is applicable to philosophical argumentation. Although
we need more examples from different forums of argumentation to conclude that the new stasis
theory would apply to any type of argument, the application has suggested that we can be
hopeful of the prospect. Thus we can tentatively conclude that a generalized stasis theory has an
answer to the Scope Problem.
Second, the reconceptualization has made each of the stases more exhaustive. The stasis of
predication, or the renewed stasis of conjecture, has come to include property claims in general,
and is broader than its classical counterpart that concerned only acts of agents in the past. The
stasis of clarification, or the renewed stasis of definition, has come to include conceptual claims,
and is broader than its classical counterpart that concerned essential definitions. The stasis of
qualification, or the renewed stasis of quality, has come to include qualifying factors to property
claims and conceptual claims, such as shifts of presumption by defeating factors, and is broader
than its classical counterpart that concerned only qualifying factors to claims on criminal
charges, such as shifts of the presumption of innocence in courts of law. The stasis of procedure,
or the renewed stasis of translation, has come to include questions about procedures in general,
and is broader than its classical counterpart that concerned only legal procedures. These points
show that each of the constituent stases in a generalized stasis theory is more exhaustive than its
classical counterpart.
The two questions that have emerged out of the investigation in this section are whether the new
stasis theory exhausts all types of claims that arguers make, and whether the stasis of procedure
is necessary. I must confess that I do not have an answer to the first question. It seems clear that
each of the stases respectively, and the reconceptualized stasis theory collectively, have become
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more inclusive. However, it is not clear to me whether the renewed stasis theory will exhaust the
possible types of claims and issues that arguers might face. If the answer to this question is
affirmative, then the reconceptualized stasis theory will be an exhaustive theory, and arguers can
use it to construct and revise their arguments. However, if the answer to the question is negative,
then arguers cannot anticipate every type of dialectical material that they might face if they use
this theory to construct and revise heir arguments.
The second question emerged out of the application of the renewed stasis theory. Since Johnson
did not make any claims about the procedures of their arguments, we are led to doubt whether
the stasis of procedure is necessary if stasis theory is claimed to be a theory for argumentation in
general. On this question, Braet's (1987, pp. 89) distinction between a potential stasis and an
actual stasis would be helpful. He states that all the four stases are potential stases, but they
become actual stases when a defendant takes them up in an argumentative communication. We
can apply this argument to the stasis of procedure, and regard it as a potential stasis on which the
interlocutor, not the arguer, has a burden of proof. In other words, the stasis of procedure is
presumed to have no problem unless the interlocutor shows a reason to doubt it. Once a doubt is
raised, then the arguer has an obligation to demonstrate that the procedure is legitimate. This
modification might better reflect the act of making arguments, because arguers usually think that
the procedure is legitimate, and that they are justified in making claims at the time and place they
advance them. If we change the burden of proof this way, the arguer is obliged to cover the
stases of predication, clarification, and qualification. The interlocutor is obliged to take up the
stasis of procedure initially, and the arguer has the final obligation to answer this stasis as well.
Based on the point on the exhaustiveness of a generalized stasis theory and these two questions, I
conclude that the generalized stasis theory is more exhaustive in its treatment of issue types.
However, it is not yet clear whether the generalized stasis theory has solved the Exhaustiveness
Problem.
Third, the reconceptualization of stasis theory has made the theory lose its conceptual distinction
to some extent at the sacrifice of its broader scope and exhaustiveness. Having its strong
substantive tie with legal issues eliminated, stasis theory has come to have a broader scope.
Also, having the narrow focus of each of the stases broadened, the theory has become more
exhaustive. However, the distinction among the first three stases seems to have blurred, because
objections and alternative positions have the function of weakening or subverting an arguer's
thesis, regardless of what stasis they are directed to.
I believe this problem arises out of the vagueness of such notions as property, presumption, or
default factors. By further attempting to clarify these notions, we can hope to differentiate each
of the stases more clearly. Although I recognize the problem, it is not fatal, because attempts to
further refine the constituent stases and to distinguish one stasis from another accordingly, are
likely to resolve the conceptual unclarity that the generalized stasis theory suffers from now.
Thus I hope that argumentation scholars interested in this theory attempt to deal with this
problem.
5. Questions, Objections, and Replies
Based on the reconceptualization of stasis theory in the previous section, this section turns to
deal with carry-over questions and objections. Specifically, I will examine whether a
reconceptualized stasis theory can offer a solution to the Exception Problem and the
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Performance Problem. The Exception Problem concerns the invention process of argumentation,
and asks if an arguer can use the stasis theory in any argumentative communication without
exception. If the reconceptualized stasis theory cannot offer a solution to the Exception
Problem, then it cannot be a system that arguers can use whenever constructing arguments. The
Performance Problem, on the other hand, concerns the delivery process of argumentation, and
asks if the use of stasis theory can cause an arguer to include replies to objections and to
alternative positions in the discourse she or he discloses in public. If the use of stasis theory
does not cause an arguer to handle objections and alternative positions, even in cases when she
or he has found them in the invention process, then stasis theory does not necessarily help an
arguer to improve the product she or he presents. In the first part of this section, I think through
the Exception Problem, and then turn to the Performance Problem in the second part. Finally,
part three of this section summarizes the question of the systematicity of the revised stasis
theory.
5.1 Exception Problem
The Exception Problem was originally raised by classical rhetoricians about the generality of the
classical stasis system. Hermagoras and Hermogenes, two advocates of stasis theory, laid out
the situations that the theory was unlikely to handle. The implication of the Exception Problem
was that classical stasis theory, which dealt with the legal argumentation, could not handle every
type of argumentative communication in the court. And if this problem applies to the
reconceptualized stasis theory, then the renewed stasis theory cannot cover all types of
argumentative communication without exception. Because of this implication, the Exception
Problem calls for our attention.
The Exception Problem actually consists of several situations that stasis theory is claimed to be
incapable of dealing with. Although Hermagoras and Hermogenes offered different sets of
situations, I focus on Hermagoras' version of the Exception Problem, for its scope can be more
easily generalized to the argumentation in general than Hermogenes' version10. According to
Nadeau (1959, p.61, 1964, p.379), the following situations constitute the Exception Problem.
1) Deficient: The participants have insufficient evidence to construct a case, so no
dispute is likely to emerge.
2) In balance: The arguer and the interlocutor have evidence equally distributed,
and argumentative communication is not likely to resolve the issue.
3) One-sided: One side has much more evidence available, so no dispute is likely to
emerge.
Before moving on to each of these situations, I would like to emphasize a common assumption
that they share. Since the word stasis means the temporary immobility between two positions
(Dietor, 1950, p. 353), Hermagoras' position described by Nadeau assumes that stasis theory
cannot cover those situations in which an initial clash and temporary immobility between two
positions are unlikely. In the first and third situations, an initial clash and immobility are not
likely to emerge, because either one side or both sides cannot make a case. In the second
10
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situation, the clash and immobility are not temporary, because there is no way to resolve the
dispute. Having exposed this common assumption, let me deal with each of the situations of the
Exception Problem.
In the first situation, or the "deficiency" situation, neither side can construct a case due to lack of
support for the claim that she or he would like to advance. Because the arguer and the
interlocutor do not have sufficient support available, an initial clash between the two positions is
not likely to occur. Because this scenario does not have a strong tie with the substance of legal
matters, it is likely to apply to the reconceptualized stasis theory. Since this situation seems to
apply to the reconceptualized stasis theory and challenge its generality, I as an arguer am obliged
to offer a reply to the "deficiency" exception.
Although the use of the reconceptualized stasis theory does not help an arguer construct a case in
such situations, it does help the arguer understand that she or he cannot construct a prima facie
case. In the process of breaking down the thesis and analyzing it under the four headings of
stasis theory, the arguer will realize that she or he does not have support for the claim. In other
words, the use of the theory will force her or him to understand the weaknesses that lie in her or
his argument. It is true that due to lack of the support the participants cannot set up the initial
clash and the temporary incompatibility of claims and settle it, but the arguer nonetheless can
realize the weaknesses of her or his argument. Thus, stasis theory can handle this situation, not
in that the use of the theory will end in the effective resolution of the initial incompatibility of
two positions, but in that it will lead the arguer to realize the weaknesses of her or his argument.
In this sense, the use of the reconceptualized stasis theory does not help the arguer fulfill her or
his dialectical obligations to respond to objections and alternative positions, because there is no
way to do so.
In the second situation, the "in balance" situation, the participants have evidence equally
distributed, and no argumentation is likely to resolve the strength of the claims that each side
supports. Because the arguer and the interlocutor have an equal amount (that is, strength) of
support , the incompatibility between the two positions is unlikely to be resolved. As was the
case with the "deficiency" situation, so too the "in balance" situation is likely to apply to the
reconceptualized stasis theory, for we can imagine that some argumentative communication
becomes saturated because of the abundant support.
Can the reconceptualized stasis theory handle the "in balance" situation? Although the theory
seems of no use to settle the dispute, it helps the arguer to construct and revise her or his
argument. The foregoing narrative has indicated that the arguer can use stasis theory to construct
her or his initial arguments, and then revise them to respond to objections and alternative
positions. Because the reconceptualized stasis theory can help an arguer to invent and revise her
or his argument, the arguer can use the theory in fulfilling her or his dialectical obligations in the
"in balance" situation.
In the third situation, or the "one-sided" situation, only one side can construct a case, while the
other side cannot or can hardly do so due to lack of the support for the claim that she or he would
like to advance. Because the support available to the participants is so unequally distributed, an
initial clash between the two positions is unlikely to come into being. Since we can imagine the
situation in which only one participant has supporting data and reasoning, this situation seems to
apply to the reconceptualized stasis theory.
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There seem to be two variations of the "one-sided" situation. In one case supporting data and
reasoning unequally favors the arguer; in the other, the interlocutor. Let me describe each of the
two situations in turn, and offer an answer whether the renewed stasis theory can handle them.
When constructing a case in the situation that favors the arguer, the arguer uses stasis theory and
finds that she has enough support to construct an argument. So she or he can pass through the
construction phase of argumentation without difficulty. Facing the arguer's position, the
interlocutor will have a hard time to offer objections and alternative positions for lack of
available support. Since the interlocutor cannot or can hardly offer objections and alternative
positions, the arguer can easily respond to them, if there are any. In this situation, the arguer can
also go through the revising phase of argumentation. In short, in the "one-sided" situation that
favors the arguer, the immobility between the two positions is not firmly set up, and the arguer
can construct her or his argument, replying to the possible and the actual objections and the
alternative positions.
Given the scenario of the first variation of the "one-sided" situation, I argue that the
reconceptualized stasis theory can handle this situation. Both in the construction and the
revising phases of argumentation, an arguer can use the theory to recognize that she or he has a
good argument and that the interlocutor does not have a good argument. Although the
incompatibility between the two positions is likely to emerge because of the unequal distribution
of support, the arguer can use the theory to fulfill her or his dialectical obligation to handle
objections and alternative positions.
The "one-sided" situation that favors the interlocutor is the other side of the same coin. That is,
the arguer in the second "one-sided" situation is like the interlocutor in the first scenario of the
"one-sided" situation. When the arguer uses stasis theory in constructing her or his argument,
she or he would have a hard time finding support. Since she or he does not have much support
for the claim that she or he advances, the argumentation would stop at the construction phase.
Also, the arguer will realize that the interlocutors will have much more support for the possible
claims that they might actually advance related to some or all of the stases. In short, in the "onesided" situation that favors the interlocutor, the arguer cannot construct an argument, and will
notice that the interlocutor can have many objections and alternative positions.
Given the narrative of the second variation of the "one-sided" situation, I argue that an arguer in
this situation can use the reconceptualized stasis theory just as the arguer in the "deficiency"
situation can. She or he uses the stasis theory not to establish the incompatibility between the
two positions, but to recognize the weaknesses of her or his argument. Since her or his argument
is so weak, the use of the theory does not help the arguer fulfill her or his dialectical obligations.
In conclusion, an arguer, in all three types of the Exception Problem, can use the
reconceptualized stasis theory, in an attempt to construct and revise her or his argument to fulfill
her or his dialectical obligations. The use of the theory does not always guarantee that the arguer
can resolve the incompatibility between her or his position and that of the interlocutor. Although
the Exception Problem shows that the use of the reconceptualized stasis theory does not lead to
the fulfillment of an arguer's dialectical obligations, it does not deny that an arguer can use the
theory in those situations in which the Exception Problem arises. Therefore, the Exception
Problem does not seem to be a serious problem that weakens the generality of the
reconceptualized stasis theory.

A Generalized Stasis Theory And Arguers' Dialectical Obligations

26

5.2 Performance Problem
The Performance Problem was raised by Johnson in his response to Wenzel's suggestion that
stasis theory would be an exhaustive approach to deal with an arguer's dialectical obligations
(1998b, p. 9). Johnson made an argument that the use of stasis theory would not necessarily
cause an arguer to include those objections and alternative positions to which she or he has no
reply. This problem poses a serious challenge to stasis theory when only the arguer is aware of
serious objections and alternative positions that might make her or his position unacceptable or
untrue, or argument problematic. If the use of the theory does not lead the arguer to include
replies to these objections and alternative positions, the arguer intentionally or unintentionally
can make her or his argument look like a better product. However, by doing so she or he violates
the constraints of manifest rationality that govern the practice of argumentation.
Since Johnson made this argument against classical stasis theory that was tied to argumentation
in a court, we must first see if his criticism is likely to apply to argumentation in general. In
replying to the Wenzel's criticism, Johnson made an argument based on the distinction between
legal argumentation and natural argumentation. He stated:
Suppose that a lawyer knows of a consideration (which he [sic] supposes is not known to
his adversary) that is highly prejudicial against his case and further that the lawyer really
does not have an effective rejoinder to this consideration. Is he obligated to raise it? I
think it is clear that the answer is No. But suppose this same state of affairs in
argumentation outside of the constraints of legal argumentation--is the arguer obliged to
deal with it? I think that he is, for the reasons cited above (that the construction of the
dialectical tier is necessary dimension of the rationality of the process). (1998b, p. 9)

From this passage it is clear that Johnson assumes that there is a significant difference between
legal argumentation and natural argumentation (to be more precise: argumentation used for
rational persuasion), and he argued that classical stasis theory will not fit well with the
constraints of manifest rationality because of the difference.
Given his position, I argue that his objection is unlikely to apply to the reconceptualized stasis
theory. I have demonstrated in the previous section that the stasis theory, with its legal
component removed, can be applied to philosophical argumentation, a premier case of
argumentation for rational persuasion. So the arguer, in the attempt to rationally persuade the
interlocutor, can use the new stasis theory to anticipate, and include replies to, objections and
alternative positions.
Does my answer offer us a happy ending to the Performance Problem? I do not think so. I must
admit that the use of the reconceptualized stasis theory does not guarantee that an arguer will
actually reply to the objections and the alternative positions that she or he has noticed in the
process of making arguments. In order to clarify my point, let me introduce the distinction in
rhetorical theory between invention and delivery. Stasis theory governs invention, or the
creation of argument, not the delivery of the argument that one has found and created. The
conclusion of Johnson's argument seemed to be correct, because the use of stasis theory does not
end in an actual reply to objections and alternative positions. However, the reason he offered for
the conclusion does not seem to be a good one. The use of the stasis theory does not lead to the
fulfillment of an arguer's dialectical obligations, not because it governs legal argumentation, but
because it has nothing to do with the delivery of arguments. The arguer's performance in public
is not the domain that stasis theory is concerned with.
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If the use of stasis theory does not lead to the fulfillment of an arguer's dialectical obligations, is
the theory valueless? I think the answer is, "No," because the invention of an arguer's response
is the first step toward fulfilling her or his dialectical obligations. If the arguer does not have a
response to the objections and alternative positions in the invention process, then she or he will
have no replies to offer in the delivery process. By using stasis theory to think through possible
types of objections and alternative positions, the arguer will have something to deliver in
response to them. Therefore, the use of stasis theory will prepare an arguer to fulfill her or his
dialectical obligations, because the theory helps the arguer lay out points to be handled with.
It is true that an arguer might not include an invented response in the argument that she or he
presents in public. However, the constraints of manifest rationality on the practice of
argumentation, if applied within stasis theory, will create an onus to include the arguer's reply to
objections and alternative positions. Because the constraints of manifest rationality demand that
the arguer behave in a way that is not only rational but also appears to be, ignoring dialectical
material known to the arguer would demonstrate that she or he is not a rational agent. Thus, in
using stasis theory within the constraints of manifest rationality, the arguer is more likely to
reply to serious objections and alternative positions that are known only to herself or himself. In
this respect, stasis theory will be a nice complement to help the arguer to fulfill her or his
dialectical obligations.
In conclusion, the Performance Problem poses a challenge to the reconceptualized stasis theory,
in the respect that the use of the theory does not guarantee the fulfillment of an arguer's
dialectical obligations. However, this problem does not seem to be so serious that we must reject
stasis theory altogether. The reason is that an arguer can still use stasis theory to anticipate and
reply to potential objections and alternative positions in the invention process, and then exercise
her or his rationality to actually address them in the delivery process. With its role limited to the
invention process of argument, stasis theory is still likely to apply to argumentation in general.
5.3 Conclusion
In this section of the paper, I have laid out two problems (the Exception Problem and the
Performance Problem) that challenge the generality of a renewed stasis theory, and offered my
replies to them. Although these two problems limit the function of stasis theory to the invention
process of the argument, the arguer can still use the stasis theory to construct and revise her or
his argument in both cases. Of the two problems, the Performance Problem seems to be a more
serious objection than the Exception Problem, given the purpose of this paper. The reason is that
the Exception Problem questions whether stasis theory helps an arguer fulfill her or his
dialectical obligation without exception, while the Performance Problem questions whether the
theory helps an arguer to fulfill any obligation at all.
In relation to the Exception Problem, I tentatively conclude from the investigation in this section
that the reconceptualized stasis theory is probably applicable to any type of argumentative
communication without exception. Using stasis theory, an arguer can know whether she or he
can construct arguments and respond to objections and alternative positions, without any
assurance that she or he actually fulfills her or his dialectical obligations.
As for the Performance Problem, the present investigation has demonstrated that the use of the
reconceptualized stasis theory does not lead an arguer to fulfill her or his dialectical obligations.
However, since an arguer can use stasis theory to invent arguments and replies to objections and

A Generalized Stasis Theory And Arguers' Dialectical Obligations

28

alternative positions, and since the invention of an argument precedes its delivery, the use of
stasis theory will prepare an arguer to fulfill her or his dialectical obligations. With a reply to the
dialectical material at hand, an arguer can decide what to include in, or exclude from the
discourse she or he will put in public. Without it, she or he will have no replies to make to
objections and alternative positions. If an arguer has a response to these dialectical materials and
abides by the constraints of manifest rationality, then she or he is likely to handle the dialectical
materials and fulfill her or his dialectical obligations. Although the use of stasis theory does not
guarantee that an arguer fulfills her or his dialectical obligations, it is the first step toward
fulfilling it. Therefore, stasis theory still plays a major role in the fulfillment of an arguer's
dialectical obligations.
In summary, the two problems examined in this section have made us limit the function of the
reconceptualized stasis theory to the invention of arguments. However, the very limit has made
us realize that the theory is likely to apply to any types of argumentative communication, and
that the use of the theory is likely to help an arguer abide by the constraints of manifest
rationality to fulfill her or his dialectical obligation to handle objections and alternative positions.
6. Conclusion
In the previous sections, I have investigated the current status of the theory of an arguer's
dialectical obligations, examined the nature and the use of classical stasis theory, generalized the
classical stasis theory and examined its use, and offered answers to the dialectical materials that
surround the generalized stasis theory. In this concluding section, I will look back on the path
that I have taken, and then look ahead to the possible paths that argumentation scholars can take
in the future. In the first part of the section, I offer answers to each of the research question set
up in section 1. In the next part, I indicate the limits of the present study about the relationship
between the stasis theory and an arguer's dialectical obligations. I end this paper with
suggestions for future research on stasis theory and an arguer's dialectical obligations.
6.1 Answers to the Research Questions
In this section of the paper, I will offer answers to each of the research questions raised in the
first section. My answers to the research questions 1 and 2 concern classical stasis theory, and
those to questions 3 and 4 concern reconceptualized stasis theory.
6.1.1 Answer to the first research question: What is the nature of the classical rhetorical theory
of stasis?
Classical rhetorical theory of stasis was a method for an arguer to invent her or his argument and
anticipate an interlocutor's argument. Since the theory consisted of potential issues that an
arguer and interlocutor could argue about, it helped the arguer to anticipate possible objections
and alternative positions that might be raised by the interlocutor. By using the theory to invent
her or his own arguments and anticipate objections and alternative positions, an arguer can
prepare herself or himself for addressing them and fulfilling her or his dialectical obligation.
Classical stasis theory, created by Hermagoras and developed by Cicero, Quintilian, and
Hermogenes, was the theory that governed the invention process, the method of finding an
argument. It consisted of stock stases (points at issue) that might potentially arise in
argumentative communication. In inventing arguments, the arguer examined that stock of issues
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to think about her or his argument, counter-positions and responses to them. Drawing on these
issues as the guide, the arguer advanced support on the thesis, anticipated the counter-positions
that her or his interlocutor might advance, and replied to them.
6.1.2 Answer to the second research question: What are the limitations of the classical rhetorical
theory of stasis?
Through investigating classical stasis theory, the third section offered four problems, each of
which marks a limitation of the theory. The four problems are the Scope Problem, the Exception
Problem, the Exhaustiveness Problem, and the Performance Problem. These problems
collectively weaken the generality of classical stasis theory claimed by Wenzel (1998, paragraph
30), and reveal that stasis theory is a specific tool designed for the invention for legal
argumentation in trial, and not fully transferable to other contexts.
The Scope Problem weakens the applicability of classical stasis theory to argumentation in
general. Since classical stasis theory emphasizes substantive matters potentially and actually
raised in trials, it does not seem to be applicable to argumentation outside the court.
The Exception Problem weakens the applicability of classical stasis theory to all types of
argumentative communication even in the legal forum. According to classical Greek and Roman
rhetoricians, the theory cannot deal with the following situations: (a) those in which neither side
can make a good case, (b) those in which all the parties in the argumentation have equally strong
arguments, and (c) those in which only one side has a good argument. In these situations, stasis
theory does not help the arguer and the interlocutor to invent arguments and resolve the
disagreement in opinion.
The Exhaustiveness Problem weakens the claim that the four stases exhaust all types of issue
that may arise in argumentation. In other words, there seem to be issue types that classical stasis
theory cannot handle. Because there are certain types of issues that classical stasis theory does
not cover, the theory cannot govern argumentation in general.
The Performance Problem weakens the claim that the use of classical stasis theory will end in the
actual fulfillment of an arguer's dialectical obligations. Because the use of the classical stasis
theory will not necessarily let the arguer fulfill her or his obligation to handle objections and
alternative positions, thus the theory might not be the tool for the arguer to use in fulfilling her or
his dialectical obligation.
In summary, although some scholars have argued that classical stasis theory is a method for the
arguer to draw on argumentation in general or to fulfill her or his dialectical obligation
(Ziegelmueller and Kay , 1997, pp. 153-167, Wenzel, 1998), these four problems collectively
weaken the claim that the classical stasis theory is a general theory of argument. These four
problems suggest that the classical rhetorical theory of stasis is a method that governs
argumentative communication only in trials.
6.1.3 Answer to the third research question: How can the classical rhetorical theory of stasis be
generalized to be applied to any type of argument?
In this paper, I have made two attempts to generalize classical stasis theory, to indicate how it
might be applied to argumentation in general. The first attempt was made to modify the stases of
conjecture and definition and accommodate more types of issues. The second attempt was made
to remove the substance of legal matters from the stases of quality and translation and have the
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theory govern argumentation outside the lawcourt. These two attempts to generalize stasis
theory has broadened the scope and the exhaustiveness of the theory to some extent, but it is not
clear if the renewed stasis theory is applicable to any and all argumentative communication.
In summary, the two attempts that I have made in this paper to generalize classical stasis theory
have broadened its applicability to argumentation conducted outside the court. The stasis of
predication can cover the structure of the world by assigning property relations; the stasis of
clarification can cover conceptualizations; the stasis of qualification can cover qualifying factors;
and the stasis of procedure can cover procedural issues governing argumentative communication.
Although reconceptualized stasis theory seems to have a more comprehensive scope and exhaust
more types of issues, it is not clear at this moment that the theory can exhaust every type of
argumentative communication.
6.1.4 Answer to the fourth research question: To what extent does a generalized stasis theory
provide a systematic tool for identifying dialectical obligations pertinent to the construction and
evaluation of arguments?
The application of generalized stasis theory in section 4.2 has demonstrated that we can use a
renewed stasis theory to identify on what stases the arguer, in the construction phases of
argumentation, advances her or his theses, anticipates potential objections and alternative
positions. An investigation into the Exception Problem in section 5.1 has demonstrated that we
can apply the generalized stasis theory to the situation in which an arguer has not argument to
offer. An investigation into the Performance Problem in section 5.2 has demonstrated that the
use of stasis theory is the first step for an arguer to fulfill her or his dialectical obligation to
handle objections and alternative positions.
In conclusion, the application in section 4.2 demonstrated that the generalized stasis theory is a
tool with which an argument critic can lay out an argument to see on which stases the arguer
advances her or his thesis, anticipates the interlocutor's objections and alternative positions and
replies to them. By using the theory, a critic can detect on which stases an arguer does or does
not advance her or his arguments, anticipate the objections and alternative positions and handle
them. Since the four stases contain the potential issues at stake, the failure to address potential
and actual objections and alternative positions in each of the four stases will be a sign that the
arguer has not fulfilled her or his dialectical obligation.
The investigation in section 5 has shown us that an arguer can use the stasis theory without
exception. In each case of the Exception Problem, an arguer can use stasis theory to see if she or
he can make prima facie arguments. Although use of the theory does not guarantee that an
arguer can meet her or his dialectical obligations, it does help an arguer to understand whether or
not she or he can make arguments and reply to objections and alternative positions. Thus, an
arguer can use the theory without exception in an attempt to fulfill her or his dialectical
obligations, though with no assurance of fulfilling them.
The investigation in section 5 has also demonstrated that the use of generalized stasis theory
would allow the arguer to anticipate some objections and alternative positions, but would not
lead the arguer to address those objections and alternative positions found with the help of the
theory. The arguer can use stasis theory to discover objections and alternative positions and
replies to them, but she or he can freely ignore them when it comes to disclosing the argument in
public. However, since the arguer cannot address objections and alternative positions without
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recognizing them and having some answers to them, the use of stasis theory still plays an
important role for the arguer to fulfill her or his dialectical obligation.
In conclusion, the present paper has demonstrated that a generalized stasis theory seems to be a
systematic tool that a critic can use to appraise arguments with regard to the arguer's fulfillment
of dialectical obligations. Also, the arguer can use the theory to see if she or he can make a
prima facie case and offer replies to objections and alternative positions to the thesis that she or
he advances. Although the use of the theory does not necessarily end in the arguer's performance
to handle objections and alternative positions, it will be a first important step toward fulfilling
her or his dialectical obligations, because ignoring objections and alternative positions specified
with the help of stasis theory will be a clear violation of the requirement of the practice of
argument: manifest rationality.

6.2 Discussion
In this final section of the paper, I discussion the limitations of the present research and
suggestions for future research. In section 6.2.1, I outline the limitations of my treatment of
classical stasis theory, and my treatment of generalized stasis theory and its relationship to the
theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations. In section 6.2.2, I offer suggestions for future
research about classical stasis theory, generalized stasis theory, and their relationship with the
theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations.
6.2.1 Limits of the present research
In this paper, I have drawn on Cicero's De Inventione to describe the classical stasis theory.
However, since there are several versions of the classical stasis theory, describing Cicero's stasis
theory as the representative of the classical stasis theory may be problematic. A study by
Nadeau (1959) has already offered for us some differences among different versions of classical
stasis theory, such as the number of the constituent stases in the theory. We need further
investigation into classical stasis theory to accurately explore its nature and implications for the
theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations, because the number of the constituent stases in the
theory is likely to affect what types of objections and alternative positions an arguer is obliged to
reply to.
With regard to the generalized stasis theory, there are three problems. First, the expanded scope
of the theory has made conceptual distinctions among the constituent stases blurred. Without
having a clear conception of each constituent stasis in the generalized stasis theory, we may not
be capable of understanding to which stasis an objection or an alternative position is directed.
Second, the blurred distinction among each of the stases makes the theory less user-friendly.
Since I agree with the user-friendliness criterion for an adequate theory of argument, advocated
by Johnson (2000a, p. 55), and since the generalized stasis theory, as conceived in this paper,
appears to be difficult to use in the practice of criticism and production of argument, I see userunfriendliness as a problem of the theory I support. Third, the number of the applications of the
generalized stasis theory is small. I have shown how the theory might be applied to Johnson's
paper about the nature of an arguer's dialectical obligations for critical purposes. Since I have
made only one application of the theory for critical purposes, we are not clear if the theory is a
generally workable theory. The application of the theory for the production of argument as well
as criticism is necessary to know the usability and workability of the theory.
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With regard to the theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations, my paper has not attempted to
clarify the type of an arguer's dialectical obligations or its overarching features. As I have stated
in section 4, there are three ways to clarify the nature of obligation. The first route for
clarification is to specify the content of obligation. Following Johnson and Govier, this paper
has attempted to specify the content of obligation, and has suggested that the arguer reply to
objections and alternative positions specified by the stases of predication, clarification,
qualification, and procedure, for these stases are often points at issue in the argumentative
communication. Since my paper has not investigated what type of, or what overarching feature
of an arguer's dialectical obligations is, we are not clear about the type and the general feature of
an arguer's obligations.
Besides not investigating the type and the general feature of an arguer's obligations, my paper
has not attempted to clarify the conceptual demarcation among dialectical materials, such as
objections, alternative positions, criticisms, and challenges. Because my paper has not
investigated the typology of dialectical material and the nature of each type of dialectical
material, my paper has not been able to deepen the communal understanding about the
constituent concept of the dialectical material that the arguer must handle in the process of
constructing and revising arguments.
6.2.2 Suggestions for the further research
The previous section on the limitations of this paper suggests some of the research to be
undertaken in future. In this section I will spell them out and add some more topics to be
researched regarding the classical and generalized stasis theory, and its relationship with the
theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations.
With regard to classical stasis theory, we need to conduct more investigation into other versions
of the theory, so that we can grasp the general nature of the theory and its implications for the
theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations. By investigating different versions of classical
stasis theory, we are likely to understand better the nature of the theory and to have a wide range
of dialectical material that the arguer must handle in the construction and revision of the
argument.
With regard to the generalized stasis theory that I have created out of classical stasis theory, we
must attempt to clarify the conceptual demarcation among the stases of predication, clarification,
qualification, and procedure, without sacrificing their broad coverage of issues. Since the userunfriendliness of the generalized stasis theory seems to emerge from the conceptual unclarity
among the constituent stases, the attempt to differentiate the constituent stases is likely to
provide for us a more user-friendly theory. Besides conceptually clarifying the general stasis
theory, we need more critical studies in which we use the generalized stasis theory as a method
to examine if an arguer has fulfilled her or his dialectical obligations.
With regard to the theory of an arguer's dialectical obligations, we need to investigate what type
of obligation it is, and to clarify the general features of obligation. Since Govier (1999, p. 214)
and Johnson (1999, p.7) regarded an arguer's dialectical obligation as a prima facie obligation,
scholars interested in this topic need either to examine if their position is correct, and if it is
correct, to clarify the specific conditions of prima facie obligation if their position is correct.
In addition to clarifying the type and the general feature of obligations, future research should
investigate the content of dialectical material, such as objections, alternative positions, criticisms,
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and challenges. We need to examine if there are any types of the dialectical material other than
these four, and also clarify each of the conceptions and the nature of that dialectical material. In
other words, future research on an arguer's dialectical obligations should attempt to demarcate
the components of the dialectical material conceptually and specify the conditions for the
arguer's treatment of each of the dialectical materials.
6. 3 Final Remark
In this paper, I have attempted to bridge the two perspectives of argument, i.e., logical and
rhetorical. I agree with Wenzel's position that "argumentation depends equally the resources of
rhetoric, dialectic and logic" (1990, pp. 24-25). Integration of the three perspectives is important
to provide a better account of argument and argumentation, and it is possible through interaction
among scholars and theories. It is my hope that my paper has paved a small path for further
interaction between informal logicians and rhetoricians.
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